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Better residential than ethnic discrimination! 
Summary
1
 
François Bonnet, Etienne Lalé, Mirna Safi and Etienne Wasmer 
 
 
Access to housing is difficult for minorities 
in France. An audit study we run in the Paris 
area showed that minority applicants do not 
face a strong disadvantage in the first step of 
the application; however, the fact that appli-
cants come from a deprived area leads to 
more frequent unfavorable outcome (we call 
this residential discrimination as opposed to 
ethnic discrimination). The puzzle and para-
dox come from the fact that face-to-face 
interviews with real-estate agents in the city 
of Paris and the Parisian region DO NOT 
confirm this result. If anything, all discrimi-
nation arise from ethnicity and agents dis-
miss residential discrimination. Our paper, 
forthcoming in Urban Studies1, documents 
this contrast between quantitative and quali-
tative methods and proposes interpretations. 
 
--------------- 
 
As a matter of fact, we started out this pro-
ject with two research questions. First, while 
                                                          
1
 This summary provides a quick abstract of the 
research done by François Bonnet, Etienne Lalé, 
Mirna Safi and Etienne Wasmer, that has been 
published online July 28, 2015 as forthcoming article 
in Urban Studies, available here. And also as 
LIEPP Working Paper n°36, February 2015. 
Another publication on this subject is « À la re-
cherche du locataire « idéal » : du droit aux pra-
tiques en région parisienne », Regards croisés sur 
l'économie 2011/1 (n°9). 
there is no audit study based evidence of 
housing discrimination in France, we wanted 
to document the extent to which ethnic dis-
crimination is operating in the Parisian hous-
ing market. Second, we inquired into the 
intertwining of ethnic disadvantage (namely 
North-African background) with territorial 
discrimination that may undermine residen-
tial mobility prospects out of the deprived 
French banlieues. These questions are of 
importance for a broad literature studying 
discrimination and the cumulative effects of 
residential and ethnic/racial inequalities in 
the US. They are also increasingly relevant in 
the French and European contexts where 
ethnic segregation is more and more docu-
mented in urban studies. The French con-
text is particularly challenging; the French 
Republican model embraces a color-blind, 
universalistic model of citizenship, which 
notably implies denying ethnic/racial identi-
fication and rejecting ethnic/racial categories 
in official statistics. Recent studies, partly in 
the aftermath of the 2005 urban riots in 
France, have challenged the myth of a color-
blind society highlighting an ethnic/racial 
dimension of inequality in the French socie-
ty. Direct evidence on ethnic discrimination 
has been documented in labor market stud-
ies with some support for interactive mech-
anisms involving territorial and ethnic fac-
tors. 
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A distinctive feature of our research is to 
make complementary use of two methodo-
logical designs. We conducted: (i) an exper-
imental paired-testing audit study involving 
rental housing applicants and (ii) a series of 
face-to-face interviews with real-estate 
agents in the city of Paris and the Parisian 
region. Our research has potential of offer-
ing both statistical and discursive evidence 
on discrimination in the housing market. 
The testing audit consisted of approximately 
500 phone calls to real estate agencies corre-
sponding to 250 different housing vacancies. 
We relied on 8 trained male and female test-
ers, matched by pairs, who called from two 
separate phones. They were attributed a few 
identity elements that may be revealed dur-
ing the phone conversation: a name, a place 
of residence, an occupation, a wage, etc. 
They were all supposed to be married with 
no children. Wages for the candidate and 
his/her spouse were also attributed in a way 
to exceed 3 times the rent of the corre-
sponding vacancy. Two discriminatory crite-
ria were tested for in the experimental de-
sign: place of residence (testers informed the 
real estate agents of their current municipali-
ty of residence) and ethnic origin (names 
given during the conversation). Hence, 
Sébastien Fournier/ Kader Boualem, 31, 
accountant, currently living in La 
Courneuve/ Versailles is a typical example 
of pair-matched testers’ identities. The test-
ers call inquiring about a specific apartment 
vacancy; they may first reveal their geo-
graphic origin (1st procedure) or ethnic 
origin (2nd procedure). They first ask if the 
apartment is still available and then whether 
it is possible to visit. Controlling for a wide 
range of the experiment’s parameters, econ-
ometric analyses show a significantly nega-
tive impact of place of residence in proce-
dure 1 while the ethnic effect is not signifi-
cant in both procedures. 
The qualitative study relied on 29 face-to-
face semi-directive interviews with real estate 
agents in the Parisian region. The study was 
presented in broad terms as focusing on the 
process of tenants’ selection with no explicit 
reference to discrimination except if the 
respondent does not mention it spontane-
ously. Interviewees were not directly asked 
about their own attitudes or practises but 
were rather asked to inform us, as experts, 
about tenants’ selection procedures in the 
housing market in general. Most agents com-
fortably talked about discrimination and 
overwhelmingly associated it with the appli-
cants’ ethnoracial origin (with skin color and 
African origin being the most cited). Con-
versely, no respondent spontaneously men-
tioned residence-based discrimination. 
Moreover, when the question was explicitly 
raised by the interviewer, most respondents 
seemed disconcerted and clearly expressed 
the irrelevance of this criterion.  
Juxtaposing both sets of our findings from 
the audit and the interviews points to an 
interesting paradox: 
• While the current residence of housing 
applicants has a significant negative ef-
fect in the audit, real estate agents clear-
ly deny its relevance as a discriminatory 
factor affecting access to housing; 
• Real estate agents overwhelmingly re-
port that ethnicity has a discriminatory 
impact, whereas ethnic origin has no 
significant effect in the audit when we 
control for the current residence of 
housing applicants. 
We discuss several hypotheses that may help 
solving this apparent paradox. We especially 
favour the following two hypotheses which, 
in our view, should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive. 
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First, the findings could reflect statistical 
discrimination whereby real estate agents 
seek to proxy the risk of non-payment of the 
rent (insolvency). In particular, residential 
and ethnic origins could correlate with ac-
cess to housing simply because real estate 
agents use these characteristics to infer the 
risk that truly matter to them. Real estate 
agents deny the relevance of residential 
origin as a discriminatory factor with good 
reasons, in that only insolvency is relevant. 
In the meantime, if residential origin is 
strongly correlated with the risk of insolven-
cy, then controlling for this variable explains 
why ethnic origin does not play a statistically 
significant role in the audit study data. This 
hypothesis thus entails that any apparent 
ethnic disadvantage is in fact “color-blind” 
and that correlation between socioeconomic, 
residential and ethnic factors is the driving 
factor of housing discrimination. 
The second hypothesis poses on the contra-
ry that ethnic stigma is predominant and that 
residential origin is of no direct relevance; it 
only intervenes in the selection process to 
proxy ethnicity. This proxying process may 
however have real implications in potentially 
discriminatory interactions given the differ-
ential “desirability biases” of eth-
nic/residential criteria. That is, it may be that 
overt information about ethnic origin (like, 
for instance, an African name) is not used to 
discriminate against housing applicants be-
cause such biased decisions appear highly 
undesirable (stressed by most real estate 
agents). While strongly correlated to ethnici-
ty, residential origin may be more comforta-
bly used to select housing applicants. This 
would explain why real estate agents report 
that residential origin is not a discriminatory 
factor while ethnic origin is. This would also 
help understanding why, in the audit study, 
overtly signalling ethnicity through the hous-
ing applicant's name did not result in dis-
criminatory behaviours. This hypothesis 
challenges the cumulative framing of dis-
criminatory criteria in audit studies and 
points toward some potentially substitutive 
mechanisms. 
 
--------------- 
 
Beyond the empirical findings and their the-
oretical implications, we also elaborate on 
some methodological reflections relatively to 
the use of mixed-method research design 
and its deriving challenges. We think that the 
complementary use of different methodolo-
gies helps overcome the shortcomings of 
each. This is particularly true in studies seek-
ing to assess for discrimination since they 
always lack for direct and undisputable evi-
dence with regard the genuine motivation of 
an apparently discriminatory outcome. In 
this respect, the paradox we find is anything 
but a weakness of this research: it proved 
very instrumental in developing rich hypoth-
eses to understand underlying mechanisms 
of discrimination. 
  
 
 
Comments by Robert Ellickson 
 
 
Bonnet, Lalé, Safi, and Wasmer (BLSW) have 
made an admirable contribution to the litera-
ture on housing discrimination. BLSW report 
the results of an audit of real estate agents’ 
leasing practices — to date, the best designed 
and most carefully executed study of this sort 
in France. Although they found some evi-
dence of discrimination by agents in the Paris 
region, their results suggest that the people of 
France indeed widely honor the French Re-
publican Model, with its implicit promise of 
equality of opportunity. BLSW found, to their 
evident surprise, that real estate agents were 
more likely to grant applicants an appoint-
ment to visit an apartment when applicants 
had begun their telephone conversations by 
identifying themselves by an Arabic name, as 
opposed to a traditionally French name. (Ca-
veat: the BLSW results reveal nothing about 
the later stages of the apartment-search pro-
cess, when ethnic discrimination might be 
more prevalent.) BLSW supplemented their 
statistical study with dozens of unstructured 
interviews with real estate agents in greater 
Paris. These differing quantitative and qualita-
tive methodologies turned up conflicting evi-
dence about the nature of discriminatory prac-
tices. BLSW claim, entirely plausibly, that their 
two methodologies ultimately complemented 
one another.  
Before providing some thoughts on the para-
doxical results that BLSW uncovered, I offer 
some more pointed observations. The online 
methodological appendix describing the audit 
indicates that BLSW focused on modest-
quality apartments in metropolitan Paris. On 
average, the dwellings had an area of about 40 
square meters, and a monthly rent of about 
750 euros. The authors’ decision to focus on 
modest dwellings is entirely defensible. But 
BLSW might have mentioned the possibility 
that the dynamics of discrimination would 
play out differently in other segments of 
French housing markets. At the expensive end 
of the market, for example, ethnic discrimina-
tion could be more of a problem.   
BLSW use “residential discrimination” in their 
title and make heavy use of that phrase. At 
first glance, I could not understand what these 
two words meant. When a tenant moves, two 
residences are in play: an old one, A, from 
which the tenant wants to move, and a new 
one, B, to which the tenant wants to relocate. 
Most discussions of housing discrimination 
focus on protecting a tenant from discrimina-
tion in the search for B. But BLSW use “resi-
dential discrimination” to refer to the possible 
practice of agents involved in the renting of 
potential Bs of giving weight to the neighbor-
hood in which the tenant’s current apartment, 
A, is located. Might there be a clearer phrase 
to express this idea, such as “source-
neighborhood discrimination”?  
The article’s title is provocatively normative. 
BLSW punctuate with an exclamation point 
the proposition that “residential discrimina-
tion,” as they define it, is “better” than ethnic 
discrimination. This normative stance certain-
ly has appeal. Because individuals commonly 
have greater capacity to disguise and alter 
their source-neighborhoods than their racial 
and ethnic characteristics, ethnic discrimina-
tion likely is the greater barrier to social mo-
bility. But BLSW might have said a few more 
words about their enthusiasm for the position 
their title embraces.  
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BLSW clearly articulate and explore the par-
adox that their competing methodologies un-
earthed. The results of the audit indicated that 
real estate agents disfavored applicants cur-
rently living in a relatively deprived neighbor-
hood. But, once BLSW controlled for that 
bias, they found that agents did not favor ap-
plicants with traditional French names over 
those with Arabic names. In the free-ranging 
interviews, by contrast, most agents predicted 
that their peers in other real estate offices 
would act in diametrically opposite fashion — 
that is, discriminate among applicants on the 
basis of ethnicity, but not on the basis of 
source-neighborhood.   
To resolve this paradox, BLSW offer two 
hypotheses. The first is that the quality of an 
applicant’s source-neighborhood might serve 
as a proxy for the likelihood that the applicant 
would fail to make regular rent payments. 
Because French law indeed makes it difficult 
for a landlord to evict a tenant who has ceased 
paying rent, real estate agents likely would be 
eager to find a proxy for risks of rent default.  
But an agent might use source-neighborhood 
as a signal not only of an applicant’s financial 
risks, but, more broadly, of the applicant’s 
social class. In The Truly Disadvantaged, a 
work that BLSW cite, William Julius Wilson 
assessed the effects of the enactment of fair 
housing laws in the United States. According 
to Wilson, these laws had enabled many mid-
dle-class black households to move away from 
traditionally black center-city neighborhoods. 
This exodus of the middle-class deprived 
poorer black households of “role models” — 
Wilson’s famous phrase — thereby worsening 
the social environments of blacks who re-
mained in the inner city. Wilson’s analysis 
assumes a person’s likelihood of engaging in 
various prosocial and antisocial behaviors is 
influenced by the distribution of neighbors’ 
social classes. Real estate agents in the BLSW 
audit might have shared that view. If so, how 
might they have reacted to applicants’ reports 
that they were presently living in Sarcelles, the 
poorest of deprived neighborhoods that 
BLSW had selected for mention? Agents 
might have supposed that applicants from 
Sarcelles would be not only less likely to pay 
rent, but also more likely to engage in other 
antisocial activities harmful to a landlord, for 
example, playing loud music late into the 
night. In short, a source-neighborhood might 
be taken as an even broader signal than the 
one the authors discuss. 
BLSW’s second hypothesis is that a source-
neighborhood might operate as a rough proxy 
for the ethnicity an applicant. In the Paris 
region, they suggest that an applicant’s current 
address might be a more reliable indicator of 
ethnicity than a person’s name. I find that 
proposition surprising, but defer to the au-
thors’ deeper understanding of the Parisian 
scene.  
How to explain the paradox that, despite 
BLSW’s findings to the contrary, real estate 
agents, in their interviews, denied that they 
would use source-neighborhood as a proxy 
for social class, ethnicity, or any other pur-
pose? On this point, French literature and 
psychological theory may offer some insights. 
For starters, individuals are not always aware 
of their own patterns of action. The classic 
statement is Molière’s: “Par ma foi, il y a plus 
de quarante ans que je dis de la prose, sans 
que j’en susse rien.” Moreover, the inter-
viewed agents were speculating not about 
their own behavior, but that of competitors. 
Their remarks suggest the influence of self-
love, a central theme of Rochefoucauld’s 
Maxims. The agents surmised that conscious 
ethnic discrimination was rampant in other 
real estate offices, but absent in their own.  
If the agents’ remarks were sincere, BLSW’s 
findings suggest that most of them avoided 
conscious discrimination by ethnicity, but 
engaged in subconscious source-
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neighborhood discrimination. The psycholog-
ical theory of individuals’ aversion to cogni-
tive dissonance may be pertinent here. Many 
Parisian real estate agents presumably have 
internalized French cultural values, in particu-
lar the French Republican Model. If BLSW’s 
normative assertion in the article’s title is cor-
rect, a well-socialized agent would regard dis-
crimination on the basis of an applicant’s 
source-neighborhood to be less offensive than 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. If 
both conscious and subconscious attitudes 
can create dissonance, agents’ self-
conceptions of themselves as upright French 
citizens would tilt them toward a subcon-
scious practice of discriminating by source-
neighborhood as opposed to ethnicity. If so, 
the paradox would stem in part from the 
agents’ inability to predict that their counter-
parts in other real estate offices would share 
their own devotion to the French Republican 
Model. 
  
  
 
 
Comments by David Laitin 
 
 
Francois Bonnet, Etienne Lalé, Mirna Safi and 
Etienne Wasmer’s “Better residential than 
ethnic discrimination! Reconciling audit and 
interview findings in the Parisian housing 
market” (Urban Studies, 2015) is a compelling 
paper. The audit study reported in this paper 
reveals without much doubt that despite a 
tradition of radical republicanism that insists 
on equality for all citizens, there is systematic 
discrimination in the French housing market.  
However, the data do not speak clearly as to 
the sources of this discrimination. On the one 
hand, the sociological interviews with real 
estate agents that complement the audit study 
uncover a powerful sense that the residues of 
empire have led these agents to guide North 
Africans away from rental properties owned 
by their clients. On the other hand, the statis-
tical examination of agent behavior suggests a 
different source of the observed discrimina-
tion; it shows that real estate agents discrimi-
nate based on the previous neighborhood of 
applicants, whether they are rooted French or 
of Algerian background. The authors bravely 
seek to reconcile these two explanations for 
the observed discrimination. 
Alas, the authors cannot fully discriminate 
between two hypotheses: (H1) that there is no 
ethnic discrimination, and that neighborhood 
is a proxy for the expected economic security 
of the applicants, and their ability to pay the 
rent; and (H3) that there is ethnic discrimina-
tion, but since it is illegal to discriminate eth-
nically, real estate agents are able to accom-
plish their discriminatory goals by using 
neighborhood as a proxy for ethnicity. H1 
would support a “statistical discrimination” 
interpretation, in which the discrimination is 
based on the perceived likely average perfor-
mance of individuals based on group charac-
teristics that cannot be directly observed. H3 
would support a “taste based” interpretation, 
in which members of the rooted population 
are willing to pay a cost in lost revenue to 
satisfy a desire to live separately from an un-
wanted community. 
Despite real estate agent assurances that they 
never discriminate on the basis of neighbor-
hood, there is some reason to discount such 
claims. To be sure, the authors are convincing 
in showing that there is no social desirability 
bias in the responses they received from the 
agents, as these agents revealed without 
shame the pressures they faced from their 
clients to favor rooted French. But something 
else could support H1, viz. that folks are won-
drously ignorant of the sources of the preju-
dices guiding their behavior. In a related pro-
ject in France, my co-authors and I sought to 
measure the degree to which discrimination in 
France was based on religion2. To answer this, 
we isolated two language communities from 
Senegal whose members migrated to France 
in large numbers in the 1970s. The popula-
tions were all from rural backgrounds and all 
faced the same indignities of French colonial-
ism. But they were split in religion between 
Muslims and Christians. Our experiment (sim-
ilar to the audit study, but for job applica-
tions) revealed that systematic discrimination 
by human resource agents was based on reli-
gion. The data revealed that the Christian 
                                                          
2
 Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne 
Valfort Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-
Heritage Societies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2016). 
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Senegalese applicant did as well as the rooted 
French applicant with virtually the same re-
sumés; however the rooted French applicant, 
when paired with the Muslim Senegalese ap-
plicant, did far better in terms of call-backs 
from the firms advertising jobs. However, in 
ethnographic interviews with Senegalese im-
migrants and their children from these two 
language communities, all insisted that they 
faced discrimination against them due to their 
race. The Senegalese Muslims never com-
plained that they faced greater barriers to in-
tegration in France than their matched Chris-
tians. It could therefore be in the Bonnet et al. 
study not social desirability that made real 
estate agents to downplay the role of neigh-
borhood, but rather failure in agent behavior 
to understand their own motives. 
However, there is a clue in the statistical data 
that pushes me to favor H3. The authors 
combine in their statistical analyses the three 
negative answers to the initial inquiry by the 
applicant: that the property is already rented; 
that the agent will call back but never does; 
and that the caller is asked to send a written 
application for more details. Interestingly, for 
the experimental procedure where neighbor-
hood of present residence is revealed, only 3 
of the 173 audits resulted in a demand for 
more information. I would suggest that if the 
worry of past neighborhood had to do with 
solvency, then the agents would have asked 
for a detailed application with information 
about salary, job, and bank account. But they 
did not do so in the vast majority of cases, 
and in fact in percentage terms five times 
more of these inquiries were demanded of 
those applicants who revealed not their pre-
sent neighborhoods but their fictitious names. 
In light of this absence of concern as to 
whether the applicants from bad neighbor-
hoods were solvent, my interpretation of the 
authors’ results is that real estate agents might 
themselves not be prejudiced against North 
Africans, but they expect their clients (i.e. the 
property owners) to be prejudiced, and fear 
that their clients would seek other agents if 
they brought too many North Africans to 
inspect the available properties. One way to 
reduce the flow of unwanted applicants to the 
proprietors is to set barriers to entry for appli-
cants from troubled neighborhoods. Whether 
or not the clients are prejudiced, what may be 
driving the results is the expectation that their 
clients are prejudiced. In a world in which no 
one is prejudiced, but in which people assume 
their compatriots are prejudiced, we would 
observe systematic discrimination without 
prejudice.  
Therefore, the audit study complemented with 
the sociological survey may well be revealing 
that taste-based ethnic discrimination persists 
in the French housing market despite a lack of 
ethnic distaste by those who were acting in a 
discriminatory fashion. 
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